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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Minimum Protection in Public School
Financing
Plaintiffs, parents of Mexican-American school children resid-
ing in an urban school district of San Antonio, Texas, brought a
class action on behalf of Texas school children living in school
districts with low property valuations, challenging the constitu-
tionality of the State's statutory financing system under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Texas public edu-
cation is jointly funded by the State and by local school districts.2
The State's statutory financing system authorizes an ad valorem
tax on property within each district which is supplemented by
amounts received from state and federal grants.2 Despite legisla-
tive efforts to offset disparities in district spending3 by increasing
the amount of state aid and by placing the heaviest tax burden
upon those districts most able to pay,' "substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures . . .exist,"' and are primarily
'The Texas State aid program accounted for 48.0% of all public school funds
for the 1970-71 school year. Local property taxation comprised 41.1% and federal
grants provided 10.9%. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 9n.21 (1973). The district court rejected an argument that the ameliorating
effect of federal aid should be considered in assessing the claim of discrimination.
337 F. Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
2Although the majority of funds provided by the state aid program was derived
from general state revenues, the local school districts, as a unit, were responsible
for providing 20%. Each district imposed a local property tax from which it received
funds, locally expendable for education, in excess of the amount of its required
contribution to the state aid program. This excess constituted 41.1% of all public
school funds from any source in the 1970-71 school year. 411 U.S. at 9 & n.21.
3The present state aid formula is a result of legislative effort to remedy more
pronounced disparities in interdistrict per pupil expenditures existing in 1947. For
the specific recommendations of the legislative report, see GILMER-AIKEN COMMIT-
TEE, To HAvE WHAT WE MUST (1948).
1411 U.S. at 10. Upon the arguable assumption that the quality of education is
a function of its cost, the appellees supported their claim of discrimination on the
basis of wealth by comparing the funds per pupil available in the districts with the
highest and lowest property assessed valuations. The Court did not decide the merit
of such an assumption, or of the use of expenditures per pupil as a standard, but
stated: "At least where wealth is involved the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." Id. at 24. For a discussion
of expenditures per pupil as a standard for measuring educational opportunity, see
Note, Equal Education: A Public School Financing Proposal for West Virginia, 75
W. VA. L. REv. 50, 58, 74 n. 113. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Equal Education].
5411 U.S. at 15. The amount of money available per pupil for education in the
1
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attributable to differences in amounts raised through local prop-
erty taxation.'
Finding education a fundamental interest and wealth a sus-
pect classification, a three-judge district court had ruled the school
financing system unconstitutional under the strict judicial scru-
tiny test, because it was not necessary to further a compelling state
interest. 7 In addition, the court declared that the State had failed
to establish a rational basis for its system." The United States
Supreme Court considered the case on direct appeal. 9 Held,
reversed. The strict judicial scrutiny test was determined to be
inapplicable since education was not a fundamental interest, and
there was no showing that the Texas statutory scheme operated to
the disadvantage of persons in a definable and recognized suspect
classification. The system was upheld under the traditional stan-
dard of review as rationally furthering a legitimate state purpose.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
Some commentators have stated that the United States Su-
preme Court employs a two-tiered formula for measuring state
actions against the strictures of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.'0 These tests differ in the burden of justifi-
cation they impose on the state. Under the traditional standard of
review legislation is granted a presumption of constitutionality and
must bear only a rational relationship to some legitimate state
purpose." When state action affects a fundamental interest" or
district with the highest property assessed valuation per pupil was roughly twice
as large as that in the district with the lowest valuation. Id. at 12-13.
11d. at 16.
1337 F. Supp. at 284. The strict judicial scrutiny test is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 12-14 infra.
AId.
'Judgments of a three-judge court are appealed directly to the United States
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1971).
"Note, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services,
and Wealth, 7 HARV. Civ. RioHTs-CIv. Lia. L. REv. 103, 112 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Evolution of Equal Protection]. For a discussion of the equal protection clause
as it applies to financing public education, and a statistical analysis of the present
system of financing in West Virginia, see Equal Education, supra note 4.
"It has been suggested that the traditional standard of review is so lenient that
it amounts to an abdication of judicial review. Evolution of Equal Protection, supra
note 10, at 112 n.25.
"Interests held to be fundamental for purposes of the equal protection clause
are criminal procedural safeguards, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); procrea-
tion, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); suffrage, Rey-
2
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involves a suspect classification'3 however, it is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny and will fail unless a countervailing compelling
state interest is demonstrated.'4
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Powell, rejected
the district court's finding that education was a fundamental in-
terest. It labeled public education a governmental service,* distin-
guishing it from a right "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
constitution."'" Justice Powell relied upon Dandridge v. Williams"
in stating that constitutional inclusion of the right and not its
social importance to the individual or society is the critical deter-
minant of an interest's fundamentality for purposes of the equal
protection clause.' 8 Conceding that some minimum level of educa-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); and freedom to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
"Some classifications held suspect are those based upon race, Hunter v. Erick-
son, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); national ancestry, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); and alienage, Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 241 P.2d 617 (1952).
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). In addition to showing a
compelling state interest, the state, in order to survive strict judicial scrutiny, must
prove that the classification is necessary to the accomplishment of the statute's
purpose and that there are no other reasonable means to achieve the purpose
without discrimination. Evolution of Equal Protection, supra note 10, at 113.
1411 U.S. at 30.
"Id. at 33.
17397 U.S. 471 (1970). Dandridge held that welfare restrictions not impinging
upon some constitutionally protected interest are not subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny. The case has been seen as an aberration. Equal Education, supra note 4, at
54. The Supreme Court of California, declaring education a fundamental interest
in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1970), failed
to mention Dandridge. Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the
Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1324, 1335 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Educational Financing].
IRPrior to Rodriguez, the Supreme Court had not defined the characteristics of
a fundamental interest for purposes of the equal protection clause. Educational
Financing, supra note 17, at 1339. Without attempting to define fundamental inter-
est, the California court analyzed education in Serrano by comparing it to those
interests already established as fundamental. 5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 618. For further argument that education is a fundamental interest,
see Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education; Educational
Opportunity: A Workable Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305
(1969). The Supreme Court expressly rejected such arguments: "[Tlhe key to
discovering whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found in comparisons
of the relative social significance of education as opposed [to that of rights held
fundamental] . . . . the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to educa-
tion explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 411 U.S. at 33. Prior
to Rodriguez, scholars debated whether the courts construed an interest as funda-
mental for purposes of equal protection analysis upon the basis of its importance
[Vol. 76
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tion may be requisite to the meaningful exercise of the constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights of free speech and state franchise, the
majority concluded that the Texas scheme provided an adequate
education for all children." Justice Powell reasoned that the Court
did not have the "ability or authority to guarantee to the citizenry
the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice."20
Justice Brennan dissented, finding no rational basis for the
Texas scheme. He disagreed with the majority's proposition that
a right may be deemed fundamental for purposes of equal protec-
tion analysis only if it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.2 Asserting that education is inextricably linked to
the guaranteed rights of state franchise and free speech, Justice
Brennan argued that legislation affecting education should be sub-
ject to the strict standard of review.?
Justice Marshall, in a separate dissenting opinion in which
Justice Douglas concurred, challenged the basis for the Court's
adoption of the two-tiered formula for equal protection analysis.
He argued that prior decisions of the Court defied such "easy cate-
gorization," 3 and that the degree of judicial review is a function
of the constitutional and societal importance of the right affected
and the invidiousness of the classification.Y Justice Marshall cited
prior decisions of the Court which he felt, conferred the status of a
fundamental interest for equal protection purposes upon rights not
to the individual or to society generally. Evolution of Equal Protection, supra note
10, at 115-21.
"1411 U.S. at 36. The shortcoming of this conclusion, as suggested by Justice
Marshall's dissent, is that no one can define "adequate" or presume to know how
much education is enough. Id. at 75 (dissenting opinion).
2Id. at 36. See generally Professor Michelman's distinction between minimum
protection and equal protection. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 HARv. L.
REv. 7 (1969). Michelman contrasts the duty of government to treat all equally with
"a more particular duty to satisfy certain just wants." Equal protection analysis
considers whether governmental benefits are distributed on an equal basis. Mini-
mum protection analysis determines whether each individual receives sufficient
benefits to satisfy certain basic, commonly shared needs.
21411 U.S. at 62 (dissenting opinion).
21d. at 63.
"2Id. at. 98 (dissenting opinion).
"4The Court's search for a less structured standard of analysis under the equal
protection clause in preference to the two-tiered formula is documented in Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court-A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Model for a Newer Equal Protection.
4
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expressly or impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution.25 The de-
gree of scrutiny applicable in review of those rights not constitu-
tionally guaranteed, Marshall argued, depends upon the extent of
their interaction with established constitutional guarantees."
The majority rejected the district court's finding that strict
judicial scrutiny was applicable on the theory that the system
involved a suspect classification, finding no evidence that any de-
finable class of poor persons was disadvantaged, 7 or that any inter-
district discrimination was based on personal family income., In-
terdistrict wealth discrimination was found to lack those charac-
teristics shared by classifications previously recognized as sus-
pect. 29 That the plaintiffs complained of receiving a poorer quality
education than residents of wealthier districts, and not that they
were totally denied an education, was critical to the decision."
Considering absolute deprivation essential to constitute the extent
of discrimination sufficient to invoke the equal protection clause,
Justice Powell explained that the Constitution only guarantees
"an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for
the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process."
'3'
The Court determined that the system rationally furthered a
2'Justice Marshall disagreed that the right to procreate, to' vote and to appeal
a criminal conviction were found in the Constitution. 411 U.S. at 100 (dissenting
opinion).
211d. at 102 (dissenting opinion).
2'Id. at 22. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan
and Douglas concurred, found the class in Rodriquez sufficiently definable to in-
voke constitutional protection, comparing it to that class of voters held suspect in
reapportionment cases. He defined the class as "parents and children in the Edge-
wood district, who are plaintiffs here and who assert that they are entitled to the
same choice as Alamo Heights to augment local expenditures for schools but are
denied that choice by state law." Id. at 69.
z'The district court's finding that there was a positive correlation between
district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents was overruled. Id. at 26. Only
in a relatively few districts was an inverse relation shown between the level of per
pupil expenditures and the percentage of minority pupils residing in the district.
Id. at 18 n.38. Thus, race was eliminated as a suspect classification. Note that
classifications based upon national ancestry have been held suspect. Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
"For example, those so saddled with disabilities, historically discriminated
against, and politically impotent as to require protection are suspect. 411 U.S. at
28.
11id. at 23.
311d. at 24 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 76
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legitimate state purpose.3 1 Impressed that the plan reflected "what
many educators for a half century have thought [to be] an en-
lightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solu-
tion," 33 the majority emphasized that the Texas financial system
was comparable to those employed in virtually every other state.34
While it was recognized that the Texas system of financing re-
sulted in "'some inequality' in the manner in which the state's
rationale is achieved" and "imperfectly effectuates the state's
goals"33 the scheme was found not "so irrational as to be invidi-
ously discriminatory."
Assuming local control to be the State's purpose, Justice
White was unconvinced that the Texas financing system rationally
furthered that goal. In a separate dissenting opinion, he reasoned
that no system which imposes a ceiling upon the maximum rate
at which a local district may tax itself-thereby precluding for
property poor districts, in law and in fact, the achievement of a
yield even approaching that of other districts-can be said to ra-
tionally relate to the furtherance of local control.3 7 Equal protec-
tion becomes an "empty gesture," warned Justice White, unless
the State is required to show that the means chosen to effectuate
the expressed goal are realistically related to its achievement.
3
1
The decision in Rodriguez does not confer judicial approval
upon the Texas method of financing public education or upon
similar systems employed by other states, but holds merely that
they are not in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.39 As the case is controlling only where a state's
method of financing public education is challenged under the
31Id. at 55.
uId.
"3Until recently, only in Hawaii was education purely state funded. That State
now permits local collection and expenditure of revenue to supplement state grants.
Id. at 48 n.102.
"Id. at 51. Apparently the Court found the State's rationale to be local control:
"While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and
encourages a large measure of participation in and control of each district's schools
at the local level." Id. at 49.
3Id. at 55. Only where a fundamental interest is affected is a state to be held
to the "least restrictive alternative." Id. at 51.
3Id. at 64-67 (dissenting opinion).
"1Id. at 68. For an argument that the means of achieving the state's purpose
should be more intensely scrutinized, see Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
supra note 24, at 20-30.
"As suggested in Educational Financing, supra note 17, at 1365.
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss1/8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
equal protection clause, it does not prohibit the nullification of
state statutory funding plans on the basis of state constitutional
provisions."
The Supreme Court's ruling is, nevertheless, foreboding. Re-
treating from what has been termed the "new equal protection,"'"
the Court definitively limits the applicability of the strict judicial
scrutiny test. The concept of fundamental interest is now confined
to freedoms protected by the Constitution.2 If wealth alone is to
be regarded as a suspect classification, the decision precludes its
applicability to district wealth discrimination not correlated to
personal family income.13 The majority indicated that absolute
deprivation of the protected interest accompanied by failure to
provide an adequate substitute is requisite to a finding of the in-
vidious discrimination necessary to invoke strict judicial scru-
tiny.4 Such a holding implies that equal protection is no more than
minimum protection. 5
Strict review is properly confined to objectively identifiable
areas in the interest of certainty and the prevention of further court
congestion. 6 However, deference to the principle of federalism is
insufficient justification for upholding the Texas system upon the
traditional standard of review. The liberal interpretation here
given to "rational" is inconsistent with what has been termed a
trend in recent decisions requiring a showing by the state that the
means chosen to effectuate its goals are rationally related to their
achievement. 7 Such a standard is distinguishable from a require-
'*Statutory funding systems have been overturned in the past on the basis of
state constitutional provisions. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). As the California financing system was found violative of
provisions of both the State and federal constitutions, the result reached in Serrano
is unaffected by Rodriguez. W. VA. CONsT. art. XHI, § 1, providing that the "legisla-
ture shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free
schools," has been compared to a provision in the New Jersey constitution under
which that State's public school financing scheme was declared invidiously dis-
criminatory in Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct.
1972). Equal Education, supra note 4, at 57 & n.46.
"Model For a Newer Equal Protection, supra note 24.
11411 U.S. at 33.
3Id. at 22-25.
"Id. at 21-22.
"'For the proposition that equal protection is no more than minimum protec-
tion, see Michelman, supra note 20.
"See Viera, Unequal Educational Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Ser-
rano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L. REv. 617, 630 (1972).
"Model for a Newer Equal Protection, supra, note 24, at 17-22.
S[Vol. 76
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ment that the state select the least restrictive alternative. 48 If
adopted, it would simply necessitate production of empirical data
to establish that the chosen system of financing is rationally re-
lated to, or actually encourages and makes possible, a substantial
degree of local control."
The Court's finding that the Texas system rationally fur-
thered the achievement of local control merely begged the ques-
tion. The majority failed to recognize that the opportunity to sup-
plement educational expenditures is meaningless without the abil-
ity to measurably improve the quality of the local offering. As a
property poor district under the Texas system is effectively pre-
cluded from achieving a yield approaching that of wealthy dis-
tricts, its ability to provide comparable educational benefits is
seriously impaired.
Rodriguez appears to foreclose the possibility of federal judi-
cial involvement in educational financing reform, thus leaving the
instigation of such reform to the state courts and the legislatures.
By bringing the issue before the public eye, however, the decision
may well spur legislative action." That property poor districts
must tax themselves at many times the rate required of districts
rich in assessable property without assurance that the effort will
produce comparable educational benefits runs afoul of the public
sense of justice. In view of growing dissatisfaction with property
taxation' as a form of financing education and other public serv-
' The Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that local control was not fur-
thered by the statutory funding program. The Court held that the system, though
imperfect reasonably allowed for local control, and should not be overturned merely
because a less discriminatory plan could be conceived. The majority stated that
only when a fundamental interest is affected will the State be required to select the
least restrictive means of accomplishing its purpose. 411 U.S. at 51.
" That central collection with local disbursement would diminish local control
is arguable. Taxation upon district wealth may not be necessary to achieve local
control. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 611, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
610 (1970).
"This effect has been described as forcing the legislature to perform its func-
tion. Educational Financing, supra note 17, at 1365. In contrast, Professor Bickel
argues that a finding of "non-unconstitutionality" serves to legitimize the legisla-
tion under examination, regardless of the Court's intent: "The Court's prestige, the
spell it casts as a symbol, enable it to entrench and solidify measures that may have
been tentative in the conception or that are on the verge of abandonment in the
execution. Regardless of what it intends, and granted that it often intends no such
thing, the Court can generate consent and may impart permanence." A. BicKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 129 (1962).
5'See Philipps, The West Virginia Constitution and Taxation, 71 W. VA. L.
8
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ices, it is unlikely that legislatures can long avoid the initiation of
reform.
Katherine P. Kenna
REv. 260, 279-97 & n.200 (1969).
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